Purpose of federalist papers 10 and 51

It is not easy, therefore, to commend too highly the judicious attention which has been paid to this subject in the proposed Constitution.This corresponds with the two first classes of causes, which have been enumerated, as proper for the jurisdiction of the United States.Would not so circuitous an intercourse facilitate the competitions of other nations, by enhancing the price of British commodities in our markets, and by transferring to other hands the management of this interesting branch of the British commerce.If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.And is it not to be presumed that the men who will generally be sent there will be possessed of the necessary degree of intelligence to be able to communicate that information.The consequences of this situation were a continual opposition to authority of the sovereign, and frequent wars between the great barons or chief feudatories themselves.Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics reared on the basis of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have, in a few glorious instances, refuted their gloomy sophisms.As the ceremony of a formal denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse, the presence of an enemy within our territories must be waited for, as the legal warrant to the government to begin its levies of men for the protection of the State.Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government, and it is equally undeniable, that whenever and however it is instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights in order to vest it with requisite powers.

In the last State the members of Assembly for the cities and counties of New York and Albany are elected by very nearly as many voters as will be entitled to a representative in the Congress, calculating on the number of sixty-five representatives only.It deserves the most serious and mature consideration of every prudent and honest man of whatever party.

When men, engaged in unjustifiable pursuits, are aware that obstructions may come from a quarter which they cannot control, they will often be restrained by the bare apprehension of opposition, from doing what they would with eagerness rush into, if no such external impediments were to be feared.Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority.The wisdom of the convention, in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by and responsible only to one national government, cannot be too much commended.This country and this people seem to have been made for each other, and it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an inheritance so proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other by the strongest ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties.So far, therefore, as either designed or accidental violations of treaties and the laws of nations afford JUST causes of war, they are less to be apprehended under one general government than under several lesser ones, and in that respect the former most favors the SAFETY of the people.Where then are we to seek for those additional articles of expense which are to swell the account to the enormous size that has been represented to us.In one instance, which I cite as a sample of the general spirit, the temerity has proceeded so far as to ascribe to the President of the United States a power which by the instrument reported is EXPRESSLY allotted to the Executives of the individual States.

Author: Alexander Hamilton To the People of the State of New York: THE three last numbers of this paper have been dedicated to an enumeration of the dangers to which we should be exposed, in a state of disunion, from the arms and arts of foreign nations.

The Federalist Papers Essay 16 Summary and Analysis

There is no station, in relation to which it is less proper than to that of a judge.Thus, we should create in reality that very tyranny which the adversaries of the new Constitution either are, or affect to be, solicitous to avert.

Other Defects of the Present Confederation For the Independent Journal.No person acquainted with what happens in other countries will be surprised at this circumstance.

Let us therefore proceed to examine whether the people are not right in their opinion that a cordial Union, under an efficient national government, affords them the best security that can be devised against HOSTILITIES from abroad.The provision of the federal articles on the subject of piracies and felonies extends no further than to the establishment of courts for the trial of these offenses.ALTERATIONS in the body of the instrument are expressly authorized.In the case for which it is chiefly designed, that of an immediate attack upon the constitutional rights of the Executive, or in a case in which the public good was evidently and palpably sacrificed, a man of tolerable firmness would avail himself of his constitutional means of defense, and would listen to the admonitions of duty and responsibility.Let Americans disdain to be the instruments of European greatness.It must nevertheless be acknowledged, when explained, to be as undeniable as it is important.It appears that the cities had all the same laws and customs, the same weights and measures, and the same money.

Even in the midst of defensive and dangerous wars with Persia and Macedon, the members never acted in concert, and were, more or fewer of them, eternally the dupes or the hirelings of the common enemy.From this review of the particular powers of the federal judiciary, as marked out in the Constitution, it appears that they are all conformable to the principles which ought to have governed the structure of that department, and which were necessary to the perfection of the system.The present Confederation, feeble as it is intended to repose in the United States, an unlimited power of providing for the pecuniary wants of the Union.To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed.Is a violent and unnatural decrease in the value of land a symptom of national distress.The procrastinations of the former would excite the resentments of the latter.

The Peloponnesian confederates, having suffered a severe defeat at sea from the Athenians, demanded Lysander, who had before served with success in that capacity, to command the combined fleets.It is one thing to be subordinate to the laws, and another to be dependent on the legislative body.The kingdom of Great Britain falls within the first description.Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest.Another general remark to be made is, that the ratio between the representatives and the people ought not to be the same where the latter are very numerous as where they are very few.

It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions by which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy.To have left it open for the occasional regulation of the Congress, would have been improper for the reason just mentioned.Should a war be the result of the precarious situation of European affairs, and all the unruly passions attending it be let loose on the ocean, our escape from insults and depredations, not only on that element, but every part of the other bordering on it, will be truly miraculous.The want of it has already operated as a bar to the formation of beneficial treaties with foreign powers, and has given occasions of dissatisfaction between the States.Will it lean in favor of the landed interest, or the moneyed interest, or the mercantile interest, or the manufacturing interest.It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions.

They could at any moment annihilate it, by neglecting to provide for the choice of persons to administer its affairs.Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Governmen t Madison From the Daily Advertiser Friday, January 11, 1788 38 Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed Madison From the New York Packet Tuesday, January 15, 1788 39 Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles Madison For the Independent Journal - - 40.In this view of the subject, by what logic can it be maintained that the local governments ought to command, in perpetuity, an EXCLUSIVE source of revenue for any sum beyond the extent of two hundred thousand pounds.But still it could never be expected to turn on the true merits of the question.But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.An ignorance of a variety of minute and particular objects, which do not lie within the compass of legislation, is consistent with every attribute necessary to a due performance of the legislative trust.If such a supposition would be unnatural and unreasonable, it cannot be rational to maintain that an injunction of the trial by jury in certain cases is an interdiction of it in others.